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Abstract: In recent years, as the popularity of anonymous currencies such as Bitcoin has 
made the tracking of ransomware attackers more difficult, the amount of ransomware 
attacks against personal computers and enterprise production servers is increasing 
rapidly. The ransomware has a wide range of influence and spreads all over the world. It 
is affecting many industries including internet, education, medical care, traditional 
industry, etc. This paper uses the idea of virus immunity to design an immunization 
solution for ransomware viruses to solve the problems of traditional ransomware defense 
methods (such as anti-virus software, firewalls, etc.), which cannot meet the requirements 
of rapid detection and immediate prevention of new outbreaks attacks. Our scheme 
includes two parts: server and client. The server provides an immune configuration file 
and configuration file management functions, including a configuration file module, a 
cryptography algorithm module, and a display module. The client obtains the 
immunization configuration file from server in real time, and performs the  corresponding 
operations according to the configuration file to make the computer have an immune 
function for a specific ransomware, including an update module, a configuration file 
module, a cryptography algorithm module, a control module, and a log module. This 
scheme controls mutexes, services, files and registries respectively, to destroy the 
triggering conditions of the virus and finally achieve the purpose of immunizing a 
computer from a specific ransomware. 
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1 Introduction 
With the popularity of anonymous virtual currencies such as Bitcoin [Biryukov and 
Tikhomirov (2019); Sun, Bin, Jiang et al. (2019); Wang, Li, Kuang et al. (2019)], the 
ransomware is increasing rampantly [Sai, Buckley and Le Gear (2019); Al-Hawawreh, 
den Hartog and Sitnikova (2019); Homayoun, Dehghantanha, Ahmadzadeh et al. (2018); 
Li, Xu, Xian et al. (2019)]. The way that the extortionist collects the ransom is easily 
tracked before the emergence of anonymous virtual currencies, causing the extortionist to 
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be exposed and eventually arrested. The extortionist uses anonymous virtual currencies 
such as Bitcoin to collect the ransom, which makes it difficult to trace back to the source 
of the extortion. Because the value of the encrypted files is higher than the ransom, the 
victim has to recover the documents by paying the ransom. This has led to the result that 
unscrupulous hackers are more frequently attacking business enterprises and individuals 
by ransomwares. 
At present, ransomware is a major threat to computer security [Zhu, Yang, Xiong et al. 
(2018); Xu, Wang, Wu et al. (2020)]. Unscrupulous hackers use ransomwares to attack 
other people’s computers, extort them and steal important information, which may cause 
a huge loss to victims. For example, the popular WannaCry Bitcoin ransomware 
[Akbanov, Vassilakis and Logothetis (2019)] caused great damages to business 
enterprises, administration institutes, and education industry; The NotPetya ransomware 
[Farral (2017)] caused more than $90 million in loss to Nuance, which is the world’s 
largest speech recognition company. 
As a type of malware, ransomware is highly destructive, and it is difficult to recover the 
corrupted documents unless the ransom is paid to the extortionist. Once an enterprise’s 
server is infected with a ransomware, the important files required for providing its 
services may be encrypted, the business based on the server will be paralyzed, and the 
enterprise may suffer from a great loss. After the personal computer is infected with 
ransomware, important private files such as photos, articles, archives, and papers may 
also be encrypted. Although the value of loss is not necessarily as great as the one of a 
business, those encrypted files will still inevitably cause some inconvenience. Some 
ransomware, such as NotPetya, often fail to recover the corrupted documents even if the 
victims have paid the ransom, resulting in irreversible losses. It shows that for both 
individuals and businesses, the damage of ransomware is very huge. There are common 
methods for preventing ransomwares including anti-virus softwares, firewalls, etc., but 
these methods are not able to meet the need of rapid detection and immediate prevention 
of rapid outbreaks of ransomwares. Therefore, it is urgent to find an effective method to 
keep computers safe from ransomware. 
Many researchers have carried out research work on malware detection and got a lot of 
research results. Kolbitsch et al. [Kolbitsch, Comparetti, Kruegel et al. (2009)] proposed 
an efficient malware detection model, which is more efficient than traditional malware 
detection methods, but it still has disadvantages that slow down the efficiency of the 
operating system. Santos et al. [Santos, Brezo, Nieves et al. (2010)] proposed an Opcode-
Sequence-Based malware detection method. Firdausi et al. proposed a malware detection 
method based on behavior detection combined with machine learning [Firdausi, Lim, 
Erwin et al. (2010)]. These two methods detect and defend malware from static file 
detection and dynamic behavior detection respectively. However, these two methods are 
still belonging to traditional malware detection methods, and they still contain many 
shortcomings of traditional methods. 
Computer virus immunity draws on biological immunity technologies, which is a way to 
refrain from detection false positives and false negatives detection, and to reduce the side 
effects of computers [Masood, Majeed, Samar et al. (2018); Jia, Yang and Guo (2017)]. 
At present, computer immunity technologies are mainly used to write and compile an 
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independent program to immunize a certain virus outbreak to spend the virus epidemic 
period. Every time the virus is overwritten, the program needs to be rewritten, compiled, 
and distributed. It takes time and resource consumption, and the release may not be 
timely. As a result, users may not get the latest vaccine. As mentioned above, now there 
is no immunization scheme that can quickly and effectively immunize a particular virus 
without making the computer overload. 
This paper proposed an immunization scheme for ransomware to solve the problems 
mentioned above, by using virus immunity. The scheme enables the operating system 
running by users to be immune to the ransomware of a specific virus family. When an 
operating system is attacked, computers will not be infected by the virus family, thereby 
protecting the user's operating system from the attack of a ransomware. 
2 Theory of immunization 
The purpose of computer virus immunity is to make computers immune to virus before 
they are infected. Therefore, a computer running virus files or successfully be attacked by 
worm will not be infected. The implication is that computers can be protected from 
specific computer viruses by using such a relatively reliable and secure manner. 
Ransomware immunity method proposed in this paper can make computers not be 
infected with ransomware in a secure way. And it is using the same way as computer 
virus immunity. The theory of the immunization scheme proposed in this paper is to 
interfere with the triggering of the virus by controlling the mutex, service, registry and 
file in the operating system. 
The theory of immunization by mutex control is shown in Fig. 1. The function of the 
mutex control module is creating a mutex. Once virus detects the mutex exists and 
determines that it has an instance of itself. It will satisfy the mutex condition rather than 
satisfy the trigger condition. Therefore, the virus cannot continue to execute subsequent 
process, achieving the goal of immunization. 
 
Figure 1: Process of mutex control immunization 
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Fig. 2 shows the process of service control immunization. The service control module creates 
a service which can be used by virus. If the virus detects the existence of infection through the 
detection service during the execution process, the virus will determine that the computer has 
been infected by itself, then it will start the harmless system to occupy the service and stop the 
subsequent infection operation, thereby achieving the purpose of immunization. 
 
Figure 2: Process of service control immunization 
The theory of immunization by file control is shown in Fig. 3, and it has four methods to 
immunize the virus. 
 
Figure 3: Process of file control immunization 
1) The first method is to create a file. Some viruses will determine a computer has been 
infected by itself if it detects a certain file already exists. At this moment, the computer 
will not continue the infection process, and may create a file process. Some viruses may 
also delete themselves in order to hide malicious files. In this way, the computer achieves 
the purpose of immunization. 
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2) The second method is to delete a file. Some viruses are triggered by the presence of 
one or more files on a computer. And if these conditions are not met, the virus will not be 
triggered. Moreover, some viruses rely on certain files to infect a computer. Thus, if these 
files are deleted, the necessary conditions for triggering cannot be met, and the computer 
cannot be infected consequently. So we can achieve the goal of immunization. 
3) The third method is to set some special properties in the file. Some viruses copy themselves 
to a directory when they infect a computer, or decrypt a malicious program to a directory, or 
download a malicious program from a C&C server to a directory, etc. If we set some special 
properties in these files, such as read-only, system, etc., the write process will fail, result in the 
infection will fail. Take an another example, some viruses must read and write a file when 
they run. If the permission fails to open, the virus process will crash or the subsequent 
infection process will not be possible ongoing. If it can interfere with the reading and writing 
of the virus, virus will crash and thereby achieve the purpose of immunization. 
4) The fourth method is to modify a specified file’s contents to specified contents. Some 
viruses will generate some marked files on the disk, such as encrypted files which be 
marked infection. If we analyze the characteristics of these files’ contents and change the 
contents of these files to the specified contents on the user’s host, the virus will determine 
that the infection has been completed, thus giving up further infection and achieving the 
purpose of immunization. 
The theory of immunization by registry control is shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Figure 4: Process of registry immunization 
Similar to the file control immunization process, registry control also contains four types: 
create, delete, set permissions, and modify contents. The theory of creating, deleting, and 
modifying contents is consistent with the file control, except that the operation object is 
changed from a file to a registry. And therefore it not be described repeatedly. 
The only difference is to set permissions. Registry has no special properties, so we 
consider using the permission settings for immunization when designing registry control. 
If the permission of the registry is set to no permission to read or write, the virus will fail 
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to read or write the registry, causing the virus to be unable to infect the registry and 
achieving the purpose of immunization. 
3 Immunization process 
The immunization scheme proposed in this paper includes two processes: 1) the system 
administrator analyzes the virus, writes the immunization and deploys the update; 2) the 
client performs the immunization operation after the user initiates the immunization request. 
Fig. 5 depicts the immunization process. Once obtaining a virus sample, it provides to 
system administrator for analysis. The system administrator analyzes the information that 
can be used for immunization from the sample, and then writes it into a configuration file 
and deploys it to the server. 
 
Figure 5: Immunization process 
After a user initiates the immunization request to the client, the client downloads the 
latest immune configuration file from the server. And then it performs mutex control, 
service control, registry control, and file control according to the configuration file. And 
finally the user’s host is immune. 
As we can see from the immunization process, the normal work of the system depends on 
the correct analysis of the virus samples by the system administrator and the correct 
configuration of the immune configuration file. 
When the content of the immune configuration file is rich enough, the user’s computer 
can be immune to a variety of viruses at the same time. When a certain ransomware virus 
breaks out, as long as the system administrator analyzes the virus, writes the 
configuration file, and deploys the update in time, the user can obtain the immunity to the 
virus in time. 
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4 System design 
4.1 Architecture 
In this paper, the ransomware-oriented immunization scheme is based on the C/S 
architecture, which is divided into servers and clients. Users use the client to get updates 
from the server and enable immunization on the client’s host. The server provides clients 
with the latest immune configuration and version query service. The network architecture 
of the system is shown in Fig. 6. 
 
Figure 6: Network architecture of the system 
The client runs on the user’s PC, communicates with the update server through the 
Internet, and obtains the update from server. After the system administrator configures 
immune configuration file, the latest immune configuration is deployed to the server 
through Internet, and server provides the latest configuration file to users. 
The client uses a three-layer architecture and is divided into a data layer, a logical layer, 
and a display layer. 
1) The data layer provides the relevant interfaces for the logical layer. The data layer 
consists of a log module, a cryptographic algorithm module, and a configuration file 
module. The log module provides interfaces for writing, reading, and clearing logs. The 
cryptographic algorithm module provides encryption and decryption interfaces for the 
data. And the configuration file module provides parsing and verification interfaces for 
the configuration file. 
2) The logical layer provides the relevant interfaces for the display layer and is 
responsible for the execution of the actual operation. The logical layer consists of an 
update module, an interface control module, a registry control module, a mutex control 
module, a file control module, and a service control module. The update module obtains 
the update from the server and saves it. The interface control module provides a refresh 
interface to the display layer. The registry control module is responsible for the control 
logic execution of the registry. The mutex control module creates and deletes the control 
structure. The file control module is responsible for the control logic execution of the file. 
And the service control module adds and deletes system services. 
3) The display layer provides interactive interfaces to users. The display layer consists of 
three parts: list display and selection, information display, and immune switch. The list 
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display and selection display the list of available immunizations to the user, and provides 
users with the interface to select the immunizations. The immune switch provides the 
user with an immune switch interface through which the user controls the start and stop 
of immunization. 
The architecture of the server is designed as two layers, the data layer and the 
interaction layer.  
1) The data layer provides interfaces to cryptographic algorithm and configuration files. 
The cryptographic algorithm module provides data encryption and decryption interfaces, 
and the configuration file module provides read, save, and verify interfaces for the 
configuration file. 
2) The interaction layer is divided into two parts, one is to provide relevant 
information display to the user’s PC, the other is to provide the administrator with the 
interface for displaying and changing the list and the interface for displaying and 
changing the configuration. 
4.2 Function module 
1) Client 
The client includes six modules, which are update module, configuration file module, 
cryptographic algorithm module, control module, log module, and network module. 
The update module is divided into two parts, check for updates and get updates. Check 
for updates part gets the latest update version from the server and compares it to the local 
version. The get updates part is used to get the latest encrypted configuration file from the 
server and save it locally. 
The configuration file module is divided into immune configuration reading part, 
interface configuration reading part, enable list saving part, and configuration signature 
verification part. The immune configuration reading part is used to read the configuration 
of the ransomware immunization from the local. The interface configuration reading is 
used to read the configuration for the interface control. The enable list saving is used to 
store the unclosed immune list locally, so that the previous immunization is still properly 
enabled after the operating system is restarted. The signature verification configuration 
ensures that the integrity of the configuration and the configuration is not been tampered 
with in the transmission and storage process, so as to ensure that the system will not be 
used to attack the user’s computer. 
The cryptographic algorithm module is divided into an encryption and decryption module 
and a hash module. The encryption and decryption module supplies encryption and 
decryption of AES CTR algorithm and RSA algorithm. The length of the AES Key is 128 
bits, and the length of the RSA Key is 4096 bits. The hash module offers an 
implementation of the SHA 256 algorithm. 
The control module is divided into five parts: mutex control, service control, registry 
control, file control, and interface control. Mutex control part is mainly used to create and 
delete mutexes. Service control part is mainly used to create and delete services. Registry 
control part is mainly used to create, modify and delete registry and values, and change 
permissions. File control part is mainly used to create, change, delete files and change 
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attributes of the files, and change permissions. The interface control part is mainly used 
to update the interface contents such as the available immune list and the ransomware 
introduction according to the interface configuration. 
The log module is divided into four parts: write log, clear log, display log and export log. 
Write log part writes the operations and results of the control part to the local disk. Clear 
log part is used to periodically clear the expired content. The display log part mainly 
displays the log formatted. The export log part mainly exports logs to other files. 
2) Server 
The server is mainly divided into three modules: a configuration file module, a 
cryptographic algorithm module, and a display module.  
The configuration file module is divided into configuration generation part and 
configuration reading part. The configuration generation part is divided into mutex 
configuration, service configuration, registry configuration, file configuration, and 
interface configuration, which are used to generate a configuration of a mutex, a service, 
a registry, a file, and a client interface respectively. The configuration reading part is used 
to read configuration files stored in a specific format on the server. 
The cryptographic algorithm module offers the same functionality as the client’s. The 
algorithm called is implemented in OpenSSL, but the calling interface and the compile 
platform is slightly different. 
The display module is divided into a version display part and a configuration display part. 
The version display part is used to display the latest version and provides a version query 
interface. The configuration display part is used to display the latest configuration file 
and digest corresponding to the configuration file. 
5 Conclusion 
Based on computer immune technologies, we proposed an immunization scheme for 
ransomware. The scheme immunizes the ransomware from four parts: mutex, service, 
file, and registry. The mutex part is mainly used to preempt the mutexes used by the 
virus. The service part is mainly used to register the service in advance that the virus will 
register. The file part is mainly used to preempt the files used by the virus, so that the 
virus cannot open the required files. And the registry part is mainly used to create the 
registry key used by the virus in advance, so that the virus cannot open the required 
registry key. This program can immunize a variety of current ransomware and has certain 
practical application value. 
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